In one-sector neoclassical growth models, consumption externalities lead to an inefficient allocation in a steady state and indeterminate equilibrium toward a steady state only if there is a labor-leisure tradeoff. This paper shows that in a two-sector neoclassical growth model, even without a labor-leisure tradeoff, consumption spillovers easily lead to an inefficient allocation in a steady state and indeterminate equilibrium toward a steady state. Negative consumption spillovers that yield over-accumulation of capital in a one-sector model may lead to under-accumulation or an over-accumulation of capital in two-sector models depending on the relative capital intensity between sectors. Moreover, a two-sector model economy with consumption externalities is less stabilized than an otherwise identical one-sector model economy.
Introduction
Economists have paid a great deal of attention to consumption externalities since the inception of modern economic thought. 1 Some empirical and experimental studies provide convincing support for the significance of consumption externalities associated with social comparison: see, for example, Clark and Oswald (1996) , Frank (1997) and Luttmer (2005) . 2 Many macro models specify preferences wherein an average consumption level of the economy affects individuals' felicity. In particular, this departure from standard preference specifications has been presented in growth models in order to account for some empirical phenomena that cannot be explained under more traditional specifications.
Generally speaking, we can classify consumption externalities as the "keeping up with the Joneses" (hereinafter, KUJ) effect and the "catching up with the Joneses" (henceforth, CUJ) effect.
The KUJ effect emerges when contemporary average consumption in the economy makes more valuable a marginal increase of personal current consumption, while the CUJ effect arises when past average consumption in the economy makes more valuable a marginal increase of personal current consumption. Many studies found the KUJ effect to be of central importance in accounting for asset prices (Gali, 1994) , capital accumulation (Arrow and Dasguputa, 2009; Fisher and Hof, 2000; Dupor and Liu, 2003; Liu and Turnovsky, 2005) , consumption across generations (Abel, 2005) , business cycles (Chen and Hsu, 2007; Alonso-Carrera et al., 2008a) , and dynamic altruism (Alonso-Carrera et al., 2008b) . Moreover, a number of analyses uncovered the CUJ effect to be crucial upon asset prices (Abel, 1990; Campbell and Cochrane, 1999) , business cycles (Ljungqvist and Uhlig, 2000) , capital accumulation (Turnovsky and Monteiro, 2007) , and long-term balanced 1 The concept of the consumption externalities and habits may be traced to Hume (1748) who argued that preferences were influenced not simply by what a person did in the past, what his/her parents did, and what contemporary peers were doing but also by the behavior of past generations of peers. Contemporary ideas dated to Marshall (1898) and Veblen (1912) and were first formalized by Duesenberry (1949) as a determinant of aggregate consumption in his development of the relative income hypothesis. More recently, the Easterlin paradox, first mentioned in Easterlin (1974) and since that time further expanded upon along with a lively debate, posits that income growth does not necessarily enhance individual welfare, and instead, emphasizes the role of consumption externalities and social comparison; see for example Easterlin (2001) . 2 Clark and Oswald (1996) presented some direct empirical evidence for British workers, showing that their reported satisfaction levels are inversely related to their comparison wage rates. Based on both the psychological evidence and the more fragmentary evidence in behavioral economics, Frank (1997) concluded that both these sources support the claim that satisfaction depends upon the agent's relative position, again emphasizing the role of the externalities it generates. Luttmer (2005) presented a detailed empirical study showing that the level of earning relative to average earning may significantly affect the individual welfare. He indicated further that the relative consumption is the most relevant proxy of unobservable earnings of other households. See also Clark et al. (2008) , Frank (2005) , and Maurer and Meier (2008) for further discussion.
growth (Alvarez-Cuadrado et al., 2004; Doi and Mino, 2008) . 3 In one-sector neoclassical growth models with constant time preference rates, only if there is a labor-leisure tradeoff, contemporary consumption externalities can lead to an inefficient allocation in a steady state and generate indeterminate dynamic equilibrium paths toward a steady state. The reason why the labor-leisure tradeoff plays such a role may be explained by using as an illustrative example a negative consumption externality. First, Liu and Turnovsky (2005) and Turnovsky and Monteiro (2007) show that negative spillover leads to over-consumption that is associated with inefficiently less leisure time and more labor supply and, with fixed capital intensity in the long run, capital is thus over-accumulated. 4 Moreover, Alonso-Carrera et al. (2008) shows that, if negative consumption spillovers make the Frisch labor supply to have a certain shape, the dynamic equilibrium toward a steady state is indeterminate. 5 This paper shows that in a two-sector neoclassical growth model, even without a labor-leisure tradeoff, contemporary consumption spillovers can yield not only an inefficient allocation in a steady state but also indeterminate dynamic equilibrium paths toward a steady state. We show these results in a two-sector model wherein the general goods sector produces goods that are used as consumption and investment and the consumption goods sector produces goods that are used only as consumption. The reasons to have these results lie in relative prices of these two goods and the factor allocation between the two sectors. In a producer's optimization, the price of general goods relative to consumption goods equals the marginal rate of transformation (hereinafter, MRT), the ratio of the marginal product in the consumption sector to the marginal product in the general goods sector. In a consumer's optimization, the relative price of general goods equals the marginal rate of substitution (hereinafter, MRS) , the ratio of the marginal utility of general goods to that of 3 External consumption habits are accumulated consumption externalities. As external habits are formed by both current and past average consumption, the habit effect is a mix of the KUJ effect and the CUJ effect (e.g., Carroll et al., 1997; Abel, 1999; Turnovsky and Monteiro; 2007; Chen et al., 2013) . Conversely, if the habit is formed only by past average consumption, the habit effect involves only the CUJ effect (e.g., Campbell and Cochrane, 1997; Grishchenko, 2010) . 4 Liu and Turnovsky (2005) and Turnovsky and Monteiro (2007) found that consumption externalities cause long-run distortions only if there is a labor-leisure tradeoff. Other than depending on personal consumption and leisure, Liu and Turnovsky (2005) assumed that an individual's preference depends on contemporary average consumption, while Turnovsky and Monteiro (2007) assumed that an individual's preference depends on external habits. As the habits are a weighted average of current and past average consumption, Liu and Turnovsky (2005) is a special case of Turnovsky and Monteiro (2007) when the weights in the past are zero.
5 Alonso-Carrera et al. (2008) extended the model used by Liu and Turnovsky (2005) with elastic leisure and studied the dynamic properties of equilibrium. These authors showed that indeterminacy cannot arise if the utility is homothetic in personal consumption and average consumption. They found that only if the utility is not homothetic can indeterminacy arise. consumption goods. The presence of consumption externalities distorts the relationship between MRS and MRT, which may generate inefficiency and indeterminacy.
Our two-sector setting has two advantages over the foregoing studies with regard to the role of consumption externalities in dynamic macroeconomics. First, our model is more general than the models found in extant literature. In effect, when the consumption goods sector does not use capital, the goods are the consumption of leisure and our model is reduced to a one-sector model with elastic leisure which was also studied by Liu and Turnovsky (2005) and Alonso-Carrera et al. (2008) . The second advantage of our modeling is that, unlike homogeneous-good models, we can treat commodity-specific externalities. We show that asymmetric external effects may play a key role for equilibrium determinacy. It should be noted that Ravn et al. (2006) , Doi and Mino (2008) and Hori (2011) studied commodity-specific consumption externalities. In analyzing models with monopolistic competition and a variety of consumption goods, those authors assume that consumers put the same importance on all types of consumption of other households. In such a situation, a consumer would be concerned equally about the consumption of food and autos of other consumers. However, recent studies in behavioral economics have offered evidence that consumers placed different importance on different types of consumption of other consumers. See, for example, Solnick and Hemenway (1998) , Alpizar et al. (2005) , and Carlsson et al. (2007) . They investigated the positionality degree for different goods based on empirical or experimental approaches. Our formulation follows such a research agenda.
In this paper we first explore the relation between consumption externalities and efficiency of the steady-state equilibrium. To see how inefficiency emerges, we consider as an example a negative externality of general goods consumption. Since there is no production externality, the MRT in the market is equal to the MRT in a centrally planned economy, thereby indicating the same capital intensity in both a market and centrally planned economy. The negative externality leads to a lower individual marginal utility of general goods consumption, thus, the MRS in a market economy is lower than the MRS in a centrally planned economy. With a concave utility, a lower market MRS indicates an equilibrium general goods consumption being too high and equilibrium consumption goods being too low in the long run compared to their respective social optimum. As a result, the allocation in the market equilibrium is different from the efficient level.
Next, we explain the indeterminacy in terms of the KUJ effect of general goods consumption.
Indeterminate equilibrium emerges if self-fulfilling expectations can be supported as an equilibrium.
Suppose that the representative agent expects an increase in the relative price of general goods. The agent will reallocate input factors from the consumption goods sector to the general goods sector which increases the MRT. Yet, more production of general goods increases general goods consumption. If general goods consumption has no KUJ effect, more general goods consumption lowers the marginal utility of general goods consumption, so the MRS is smaller than the higher MRT. Then, self-fulfilling expectations of a higher relative price of general goods cannot be supported as an equilibrium. However, when general goods consumption has a KUJ effect, then more general goods consumption can increase the MRS so as to keep pace with the higher MRT and the higher relative price of general goods. As a result, self-fulfilling expectations about higher relative prices of general goods can be supported as an equilibrium.
We should note that in one-sector growth models, when production externalities establish indeterminacy, it requires that labor supply be elastic and in particular the labor supply and demand curves cross with the ''wrong slopes'' (e.g., Benhabib and Farmer, 1994; Farmer and Guo, 1994) .
Moreover, when consumption externalities create indeterminacy in one-sector growth models, it still requires a labor-leisure tradeoff so the externality can cause the Frisch labor supply to have a certain shape, even though the labor supply need not cross the labor demand with the ''wrong slopes'' (Alonso-Carrera et al., 2008) . In our two-sector model, general goods consumption externalities produce indeterminacy even when there is no labor-leisure tradeoff. 6 Our primary findings are as follows. First, even with a negative spillover of general goods consumption, capital is over (resp. under) accumulated if the general goods sector is more (resp. less) capital-intensive than the consumption sector. This result is in sharp contrast to the one-sector model studied by Liu and Turnovsky (2005) and Turnovsky and Monteiro (2007) wherein a negative externality of general goods consumption must lead to an over-accumulation of capital.
Although consumption externalities distort the allocation of capital in a two-sector model, we find that no active capital taxes are necessary once the sources of consumption distortions are identified and corrected by consumption taxes.
Next, when the general goods sector is more capital intensive, each of general goods consumption externalities and consumption externalities can easily establish indeterminacy, and it is easier for the consumption externality in the consumption goods sector to produce indeterminacy.
The consumption good is reduced to leisure if capital is not an input in this sector. This foregoing result is contrary to existing one-sector models studied by Benhabib and Farmer (2000) and Weder (2004) who found that the leisure externality itself cannot create indeterminacy. Further, if there are symmetric degrees of consumption externalities from both goods, the utility is homothetic and the competitive equilibrium is efficient in a steady state. However, we still find indeterminate equilibrium because symmetric externalities produce different shadow prices of capital between a market and a socially planned economy which cause market failures in transitions. The result is different from the one-sector growth model studied by Alonso-Carrera et al. (2008) wherein consumption externalities in a homothetic utility do not lead to indeterminacy. Finally, it does not matter whether consumption externalities are from general goods, consumption goods or both goods, we find that it is much easier for a two-sector growth model to trigger indeterminacy than an otherwise identical one-sector growth model with elastic leisure.
We organize this paper as follows. We set a two-sector model with consumption externalities in Section 2. In Section 3, we study welfare properties. In Section 4, we investigate the dynamic properties of equilibrium. Finally, concluding remarks are found in Section 5.
The Basic Model
The economy is populated by a representative firm and a representative household. There are two sectors: the general goods (y1) and consumption goods sectors (y2). The general goods sector produces goods that are used as consumption and investment and the consumption goods sector produces pure consumption goods only. We will also refer to general goods as goods 1 and to consumption goods as goods 2. 7 The representative firm hires labor and rents capital in order to produce goods in the two sectors. The representative household has a fixed supply of labor which is normalized to unity and chooses savings and consumption of both goods.
Technology
The production function is
where k i and l i are capital and labor allocated to sector i.
We assume that the function f i is twice continuously differentiable and is homogenous of degree one with respect to both inputs. Moreover, the function is strictly increasing and strictly 7 Our model is a variant of those posited by in Whelan (1993) , Rogerson (2008) and Duarte and Restuccia (2010) . Goods 1 may be thought of as manufactured goods and goods 2 as service goods. Alternatively, goods 2 may be interpreted as home goods as in Benhabib et al. (1991) and Greenwood and Hercowitz (1991) .
concave in inputs and satisfies the Inada condition. 8 Our basic assumption is that sector 1 is more capital intensive than sector 2, but we also consider the opposite case.
Preference
The representative household supplies all its labor to work and there is thus no leisure activity.
The household's utility is affected not only by personal consumption but also by average consumption in the society. Let ρ>0 denote the time preference rate, c i denote personal consumption of goods i=1, 2 and i c denote average consumption of goods i in the society. The agent's lifetime utility is represented by
In what follows we focus on the case ε≠1 and θ 1 ≠θ 2 . The following proposition characterizes a steady-state competitive equilibrium allocation for the parametric version of our model. To see the properties in proposition 2, we rewrite (3a) as
where
are the capital intensity in sector 1 and 2, respectively.
Then, the production function in (1) becomes
.
Then, the relative price satisfies
and (5c) becomes
In a steady state,
and, in view of (11b), the steady-state levels of capital intensity, x 1 and x 2 , are uniquely determined and are independent of the presence of consumption externalities. The relative price p is thus uniquely determined. The steady-state expression of (7a) in terms of the utility function (10a) is
When the external effects are internalized, (7b) is expressed as
With no production externalities, (5d) and (6d) determine the same long-run capital-labor ratio
for a social optimum and an equilibrium and thus the MRT in (12a) and the MRT p in (12b) are equal. As a result, the MRS in (12a) and the MRS p in (12b) are equal. Under θ1=θ2=θ, there are symmetric consumption externalities and the utility is homothetic. Due to the homothetic utility, the same allocation in a competitive equilibrium and in a social optimum leads to an equalization of the planner's MRS p in (12b) and the market's MRS in (12a). As a result, an allocation in a market economy is the same as an allocation in a centrally planned economy and is thus efficient in the long run. Conversely, under θ 1 ≠θ 2 and thus To see how the relative consumption externalities interact with relative capital intensities between the two sectors and determine whether capital is over or under accumulated, note that the equilibrium shares and the social optimum shares of capital and labor between the two sectors
When using this relationship, the equilibrium consumption good is
which is linear in the fraction of equilibrium labor allocated to the consumption goods sector.
When θ 1 >θ 2 >0 and thus (1-θ 1 )/(1-θ 2 )<1, the concave utility indicates that long-run equilibrium consumption c1 is too high and equilibrium consumption c2 is too low compared to the social optimum c 1 p and c 2 p , respectively. From (13a), c 2 is proportional to 1-l and thus 1-l is too low compared to the social optimum 1-l p. A fixed labor supply in the economy indicates that equilibrium labor l is over-valued, thus dl>0. The equilibrium capital stock k is higher than the social optimum k p if the increase in l is larger than the increase in s. Specifically, a fixed sk l
If the capital intensity is the same in both sectors (i.e., α1=α2), the fraction of capital and the fraction of labor in the economy allocated to sector 1 are the same (s=l). Then, (13b) suggests that, despite consumption externalities, the equilibrium capital stock k is the same as the social optimum k p . Conversely, if sector 1 is more capital-intensive than sector 2 (i.e., α 1 >α 2 ), then the fraction of capital allocated to sector 1 is larger than the fraction of labor allocated to sector 1 (i.e., s>l); if sector 1 is less capital-intensive than sector 2 (i.e., α 1 <α 2 ), then the fraction of capital allocated to sector 1 is smaller than the fraction of labor allocated to sector 1 (i.e., s<l). Then, (13b) indicates that the steady-state equilibrium capital is over-accumulated if sector 1 is more capital-intensive (α1>α2) and under-accumulated if sector 1 is less capital-intensive (α1<α2).
Alternatively, when θ 2 >θ 1 >0 and thus (1-θ 1 )/(1-θ 2 )>1, steady-state equilibrium consumption c 1 is too low and equilibrium consumption c2 is too high compared to the social optimum c1 p and c2 p , respectively. Over-valued c 2 indicates that equilibrium 1-l is too high compared to the social optimum 1-l p . Then, l is under-valued, thus dl<0. As a result, (13b) indicates that the steady-state capital is under-accumulated if sector 1 is more capital-intensive than sector 2 (α 1 >α 2 ) and over-accumulated if sector 1 is less capital-intensive (α 1 <α 2 )
This completes the proof of Proposition 2.
Finally, it should be noted that that under α 2 =0, c 2 =(1-l) is leisure. If θ 2 =0, then our model is reduced to the one-sector growth model with elastic leisure studied by Liu and Turnovsky (2005) .
In this case, if the consumption of general goods is jealousy (i.e., θ 1 >0), capital is over-accumulated in a steady state in a one-sector growth model. In addition to jealousy consumption, now we introduce jealousy leisure (θ 2 ≠0) into a one-sector growth model which was not analyzed by Liu and Turnovsky (2005) . In particular, if θ2>θ1>0, since α1>α2=0, equilibrium consumption c1 is too low and equilibrium leisure c 2 =1-l is too high compared to the social optimum c 1 p and c 2 p =1-l p , respectively. Thus, equilibrium labor supply l is under-valued, hence l<l p . With the same capital-labor ratio for both the market and the social optimum in a steady state, the equilibrium of capital stock k is lower than the social optimum k p .
As consumption externalities distort resource allocation in the long run, it follows that the
is used in the second equality.
allocation in the short run must be inefficient. 10 There is an opportunity for government tax policy to improve efficiency. In the next subsection, we analyze the optimal tax policy
Optimal Tax Policy
Consider again a decentralized economy. Let τk, τc1, τc2 be denoted as the tax rates on capital and the consumption of goods 1 and goods 2, respectively, and let T denote lump-sum transfers (or taxes). 11 The representative household maximizes the lifetime utility (2), subject to the following budget constraint,
l is the return to capital. The government maintains a balanced budget, rebating all tax revenues to the households in a lump-sum fashion
The objective is to characterize an optimal tax structure such that the decentralized economy mimics the dynamic equilibrium path of the centrally planned economy in (6a)-(6d). To achieve this,
we allow the tax rates τk, τc1, τc2 to be time-varying. First, we derive the optimal conditions of a decentralized economy with taxes. Then, we replicate the allocation in a decentralized economy with that in a centralized economy. Replication involves setting time-varying tax rates such that the allocation of capital and consumption is equal in a decentralized economy and in a centralized economy, which requires
or equivalently κλ=λ p , where κ>0 is an arbitrary constant. The main results are as follows (see the Appendix). Intuitively, as there are consumption externalities and no production externalities, optimal consumption taxes are needed. If there are negative (or positive) consumption externalities of goods i=1, 2 and thus u i <0 (or u i >0), the consumption of goods i is more (or less) than an efficient level. Then, the government should tax (or subsidize) the consumption of goods i and therefore, τ ci >0 (or τ ci <0). Although both consumption externalities distort the allocation of capital, no active capital taxes are necessary once the sources of consumption distortions are identified and corrected by consumption taxes. The capital income tax can thus be set to zero.
Proposition 3. . In a neoclassical economy with general goods and consumption goods, the entire time path of the optimal resource allocation can be obtained by setting tax rates at each instant of time in accordance with
In a special case when goods 2 is leisure, then the tax on the consumption of goods 2 is a tax on leisure; thus, it is a negative labor income tax. This is the case analyzed in Liu and Turnovsky (2005) wherein leisure has no externalities and thus u4=0. In this case of u4=0, the labor income tax 
which is identical to that in Turnovsky (2005, p.1117) .
In a more general case when goods 2 is leisure and leisure has externalities (u 4 ≠0), then the optimal tax rate on labor income varies over time given by
In particular, in the most general case wherein the production of goods 2 requires both capital and labor, the tax on the consumption of goods 2 is different from the tax on labor income. In these general cases, the tax rate on the consumption of goods 1 is the expression in proposition 3 which is different from the expression in (14c) above.
Indeterminacy in Transitional Dynamics
Consumption externalities cause not only an inefficient allocation in a steady state, but they also generate indeterminate equilibrium paths toward a steady state. This section analyzes the conditions of indeterminacy.
Conditions of Indeterminacy
Dynamic equilibrium conditions in a competitive market are summarized by (4a)-(4b) and (5a)-(5d) with six variables: c 1 , c 2 , s, l, λ and k. Different from a one-sector model, our model involves two goods and it is difficult to simplify these equations to a dynamic system with a state vector {k, c 1 }. We will simplify them to a system with a state vector {k, λ} as follows. 12 First, with the help of (4b) and (5a)- (5c), we use (5d) to obtain the Keynes-Ramsey condition.
Next, with (4b) and (5a)- (5c), we rewrite the general goods market clearance condition (4a).
Equations (15a) and (15b) constitute a simplified dynamic system. The steady state is determined by   0 k and   0. λ The dynamic property of equilibrium is analyzed if we take
Taylor's linear expansion of (15a)-(15b) around the steady state (k, λ). The expansion gives
The dynamic system (15c) includes a state variable whose initial value is given at k(0). There are two roots associated with the Jacobian matrix in (15c), denoted by J. The steady state is a saddle if there is only one root with a negative real part and a sink if there are two roots with negative real parts. If the steady state is a sink, the equilibrium path toward the steady state is indeterminate.
Before analyzing dynamic properties, we investigate the existence and uniqueness of a steady state in the case without consumption externalities (θ 1 =θ 2 =0). First, for the slope of the   * 0 k locus in the (k, λ) plane, 13 we find J * 21>0 and J * 22>0 when k is small and J * 22<0 when k is large. The sign of J * 21 is positive, since a higher λ (a higher shadow price of capital) attracts more capital and labor to the general goods sector and thus increases general goods production. It also reduces general goods consumption, due to an increased cost of general goods consumption relative to consumption goods. Moreover, for the sign of J * 22, when k is small, because of a high marginal product of capital, larger capital increases more production of general goods than consumption of general goods. When k is very large, because of a diminishing marginal product of capital, the production of general goods is increased less than the increase in the consumption of general goods. Thus, J * 22 >0 when k is small and J * 22 <0 when k is large. As a result, the   * 0 k locus is downward sloping when k is smaller than a threshold and upward sloping when k is larger than the threshold, just like the   * 0 k locus in the standard one-sector growth model. See Figure 1 .
Moreover, it is easy to show that
that the   * 0 k locus approaches λ=∞ on both ends of k=0 and k=∞.
[Insert Figure 1 about here]
Next, for the slope of the   * 0 λ locus, we find J * 11<0 and J * 12>0. For a given k, a higher λ decreases the consumption of general goods which increases the marginal utility of general goods consumption and leads to a higher MRS between c1 and c2 in (5b). In optimum, the marginal product of labor and capital in general goods relative to that in consumption goods in (5b) and (5c) needs to increase. Thus, J * 11<0. Further, a larger capital has two effects. It decreases the marginal product of capital which directly increases the shadow price of capital. As sector 1 is more capital intensive than sector 2 under construction, the Rybczynski theorem stipulates that larger capital and labor shares are allocated to sector 1. A larger labor share increases the marginal product of capital which indirectly decreases the shadow price of capital. In general, the direct effect dominates the indirect effect and thus J * 12>0. As a result, the   * 0 λ locus is upward sloping in the (λ, k) plane.
See A1 and A2 in Figure 1 . Moreover, it is clear to see
condition implies an infinite marginal product of capital. Thus, the   * 0 λ locus will start from a finite value of k so that at λ=0, the marginal product of capital can equal the sum of the discount rate and the depreciation rate.
The shape of the two loci indicates that the   * 0 λ locus intersects the   * 0 k locus only once and there is a unique steady state (k, λ). The   * 0 λ locus may intersect the   * 0 k locus at the downward (A1) or upward (A2) sloping segment as illustrated in Figure 1 .
In the two-sector growth model without consumption externalities, the steady state is a saddle.
This indicates that there is only one root with a negative real part and the condition is 
Condition KUJ:
The KUJ effect may lead to J11>0 so the locus   0 λ is negatively sloping. To illustrate this point, suppose that general goods consumption exhibits a KUJ effect. Then, when the KUJ effect is sufficiently large, a higher λ increases rather than decreases general goods consumption which reduces the MRS between c 1 and c 2 . In optimum, the marginal product of labor and capital in the general goods sector relative to that in the consumption goods sector in (5b) and (5c) needs to decrease. Thus, J 11 >0, so the   0 λ locus is negatively sloping.
When the   0 λ locus is negatively-sloping, the dynamic property of equilibrium may change.
In particular, when the negatively-sloping
and B2 of Figure 1 , the steady state is a sink. This requires two roots with negative real parts and the conditions are Det(J)=J 11 J 22 -J 21 J 12 >0 and Tr(J)=J 11 +J 22 <0, which are equivalent to (-J 12 /J 11 )< (-J22/J21)>(or<)0. Thus, the negatively-sloping   0 λ is steeper than locus   0 k .
A Parametric Version
For ease of exposition, in this subsection we use the parametric version of the utility function (10a) and the production function (10b) to illustrate the dynamic properties of equilibrium. The utility function stipulates that if [-θi(ε-1)]>0, then goods i consumption exhibits the KUJ effect. The 2x2 dynamical equations in (15a) and (15b) are derived as follows.
First, with the production function (10b), factor allocation between sectors in (5c) leads to
The positive sign is due to the complement of capital and labor.
Feasibility of l restricts
and thus   ( ) .
l s l s
Next, the production function (9b) and the consumption goods equilibrium (4b) indicate
Intuitively, a smaller share of capital allocated to sector 2 (i.e., a larger s) reduces the production and consumption of goods 2. Moreover, larger capital in the economy indicates more capital allocated to sector 2 which increases the production and consumption of goods 2.
Further, with the utility (10a), (5a) is 
if θ1=0; ambiguous if otherwise. 14 Thus, if θ1=θ2=0, Furthermore, using (4b), (5a) and (16a)-(16c), the utility function (10a) and the production function (10b), the equalization of the MRS to the MRT in (5b) is rewritten as
where the KUJ effect affects the MRS between goods 2 and 1 via c 1 (λ, c 2 ). This condition gives
where Intuitively, it follows that without consumption externalities, for a given k, a higher shadow price of capital must 14 In the parametric version,
decrease c1 in order to increase the MRS between c1 and c2. Optimally, a larger share of capital needs to be allocated to the general goods sector (i.e., increases s) in order to decrease the marginal product of capital in general goods relative to consumption goods so as to increase the MRT. For a given λ, if capital increases, since sector 1 is more capital intensive than sector 2, the Rybczynski theorem stipulates that more capital is allocated to sector 1 and thus s increases. However, with consumption externalities, these relationships are ambiguous. In particular, with the KUJ effect, a higher shadow price of capital decreases the share of capital allocated to the general goods sector.
Finally, with the use of (16a)-(16d), the dynamic equations in (15a) and (15b) are
To envisage the dynamic property, by differentiating (17a) and (17b) around the steady state, with the use of (16a), we obtain the elements in the Jacobian matrix in (15c) as follows.
In the case of θ1=θ2=0 and thus, the two-sector growth model without consumption externalities, (16d) indicates
Thus, J * 11<0. As sector 1 is more capital intensive than sector 2 under construction, an expansion of capital increases capital (sk) and labor (l) allocated to sector 1; moreover, capital sk is increased proportionally more than the proportional increase of labor l, thus J * 12 >0. As a result, the   * 0 λ locus is positive sloping:
and thus J * 21 >0. The sign of J * 22 depends on the threshold of k, denoted by  , k wherein the marginal product of capital minus the effect of capital on consumption is equal to the deprecation rate, and J * 22>(resp.<)0 when    ( . ) . k resp k 15 Thus,   * 0 k is a U-shaped locus as illustrated in Figure 1 .
In a two-sector growth model without consumption externalities, the steady state is a saddle. remaining unchanged, we examine the levels of θ 1 and θ 2 with variations of ε and γ in preference specifications under which indeterminacy may emerge. As to the factor-intensity ranking between the two sectors, we focus mainly on the case where the general good sector is more capital intensive than the pure consumption good sector. We also briefly consider the opposite case.
The condition is
The value k k is determined by
Only goods 1 has consumption externalities
First, we consider the externality arising only from general goods consumption; that is, θ 1 ≠0 and θ2=0. This is the type of externalities analyzed in existing one-sector models studied by Gali (1994) , Dupor and Liu (2003) , Liu and Turnovsky (2005) and Alonso-Carrera et al. (2008) .
With general goods consumption externalities, when there is the KUJ effect, self-fulfilling expectations can be supported as an equilibrium. To explain the reasons, we use (5a)-(5c) to obtain
( (1 ) , (1 )
Suppose that there are sunspot expectations that the relative price of general goods in terms of consumption goods will increase (higher p). This raises the MRT between general goods and consumption goods. Thus, the agent allocates more capital and labor to the general goods sector (thus sk and l are increased) which will lower the marginal product in the general goods sector and raise the marginal product in the consumption goods sector. Yet, more capital and labor in the general goods sector increases the production of general goods which increases general goods consumption. If there is no consumption externality (θ 1 =0), (19) indicates a lower MRS between c 1 and c2 which will not equal the MRT. As a result, anticipations of higher prices of general goods relative to consumption goods cannot be supported as an equilibrium. Suppose instead that θ 1 ≠0
and there is the KUJ effect, [-θ1(ε-1)]>0. If the KUJ effect is sufficiently large and is within a proper range, then the increase in general goods consumption can raise the MRS so as to equal the MRT.
In this situation, self-fulfilling expectations can be supported as equilibrium.
To see how a sufficiently large KUJ effect leads to indeterminacy, with goods 1 consumption externalities, the elements of the Jacobian matrix in (18a)-(18d) are: J θ1 11, J θ1 12, J θ1 21 and J θ1 22. 18 The change in the dynamic property of equilibrium comes mainly from the change in the sign from J * 11 <0 to J θ1 11 >0 as a result of the KUJ effect. When θ 1 ≠0,
and the sign of J θ1 11>0 is opposite to the sign of
18 A superscript θ i is used to represent the source of externalities from consumption c i . To obtain the required KUJ effect under which the steady state is a sink, in the Appendix we have shown that the relative slope condition gives
where φ 1 and b 1 are coefficients that are functions of consumption and the shadow price of capital evaluated at the steady state. This inequality gives the KUJ effect wherein the steady state is a sink.
Recall that when α 2 =0, c 2 =A 2 (1-l ) is leisure. 19 With θ 2 =0, our model in this subsection is reduced to the one-sector growth model with elastic labor supply studied by Alonso-Carrera et al. It is interesting to explore whether the conditions of indeterminacy are quantitatively easy to meet under proper preference specifications summarized by parameters θ1, ε and γ. Without estimated values of θ 1 and θ 2 , our quantitative strategy is as follows. We calibrate our model to the 19 In this case, s=1 and there is no relationship (16a). If we normalize A 2 =1, then (16b) is changed to c 2 =(1-l), which is leisure, (16c) is c1=c1(λ, 1-l), and (16d) is 1-l(λ, k) ).
baseline economy without consumption externalities (i.e., θ1=θ2=0). Then, with all other values in the baseline parameterization remain unchanged we vary the values of preference parameters θ 1 , ε and γ that satisfy the equilibrium conditions and calculate the required smallest degree of the KUJ effect (i.e., θ 1 (ε-1)) which causes indeterminacy. If the required smallest value of the KUJ effect is smaller than the foregoing estimates found by Maurer and Meier (2008) and Ravin (2007) , then local indeterminacy is plausible.
To calibrate the model, the capital share in the general goods sector is set at α1=0.32 following Herrendorf and Valentinyi (2008) . The consumption goods sector is thought of as the service sector which includes restaurants, transportation services, and financial and retail services. Lee and Wolpin (2006) provided estimates of the share of labor earnings in the service sector in selected years by using the data coming from the Bureau of Economic Analysis in the U.S. Following their estimation, the labor share in the consumption sector is set equal to 72% which is the average share of labor earnings in the service sector from 1985 to 2000. Hence, the implied value of α2 is 0.28.
Moreover, these two authors pointed out that as a fraction of total employment, service-sector employment grew from 57 percent to 75 percent between 1950 and 2000. We take this number and set 1-l=0.75. For the value of the ES between two consumption goods, we choose ε=1.25 as our baseline value, which is in the range estimated by Ogaki and Reinhart (1998) . Under these values, we use (5b) to calculate γ=0.1654. Then, according to (5c), we calculate s= 0.2874. If we set the depreciation rate to equal δ=0.05 and the discount rate to equal ρ=0.04, as conventionally suggested, we can use the steady-state condition in (14a) to compute k * =5.6179. Finally, we use (4a) and (7a) to obtain c1 * =0.1732 and c2 * =1.1987. We found that the steady state is a saddle. Then, with all other parameter values in the baseline remaining unchanged, we change preference parameters θ 1 , ε and γ that cause local indeterminacy.
To start, we consider a special model of α 2 =0, the one-sector growth model with elastic leisure studied by Alonso-Carrera et al. (2008) . We hold α2=0 and all other parameter values unchanged and adjust the values of θ 1 , ε and γ that meet equilibrium conditions. In the right diagram of Figure   2 , the shaded area is the region of (ε, -θ1) under which the steady state is a sink. In this case, indeterminacy arises when ε<1 and -θ 1 <0. Thus, when the labor supply is elastic, the general goods consumption externality generates indeterminacy only when the consumption externality is negative.
The estimates in Zabalza et al. (1980) indicates that the ES between general goods and leisure is around ε=0.5. 20 At ε=0.5, indeterminacy is established at the smallest value of θ1=2.2798. 21 The required smallest degree of the KUJ effect is [(-θ 1 )(ε-1)]=1.1399, which is larger than the estimates obtained by Maurer and Meier (2008) and Ravina (2007) . The result suggests that it is difficult for consumption externalities to create indeterminacy in a one-sector model.
[Insert Figure 2 here] Now, we quantify our general two-sector growth model and thus y 2 is consumption goods. We hold α2=0.28 and all other parameter values unchanged and vary the values of θ1, ε and γ that meet equilibrium conditions. The results are illustrated in the left diagram of Figure 2 . In the diagram, the shaded area is the region of (ε, -θ1) under which the steady state is a sink. Here, indeterminacy arises only when ε>1 and -θ 1 >0. Thus, with the consumption goods sector, general goods consumption externalities generate indeterminacy only when the externality is positive. At the empirically plausible value of ε=1.25 estimated by Ogaki and Reinhart (1998) , the smallest absolute value of -θ1 where indeterminacy can be established is -θ1=4.2%. 22 The required smallest degree of the KUJ effect is (-θ 1 )(ε-1)=0.0105 which is smaller than the estimates obtained by Maurer and Meier (2008) and Ravina (2007) . Indeed, the requirement is only 1% as large as the smallest degree required in a one-sector model. The results imply that it is easy for consumption externalities to establish indeterminacy in a two-sector model.
Only goods 2 has consumption externalities. (θ1=0, θ2≠0).
Next, we consider the externality arising only from consumption goods. To see why the KUJ effect of consumption goods can generate indeterminacy, we use (5a)-(5c) to obtain
To see that sunspot expectations equilibrium can emerge, suppose that the representative agent expects that the price of general goods relative to consumption goods is increasing (higher p).
This raises the MRT between general goods and consumption goods. Thus, the agent allocates more input to the general goods sector and less input to the consumption goods sector which reduces the marginal product in the general goods sector, increases the marginal product in the consumption goods sector and reduces the production of consumption goods. When the KUJ effect of consumption goods ([-θ2(ε-1)]>0) is sufficiently large, then consumption goods are consumed less so as to increase the MRS and equal the MRT. Thus, self-fulfilling expectations can be supported as an equilibrium.
In the case, the elements of the Jacobian matrix in (18a)-(18d) are: J θ2 11 , J θ2 12 , J θ2 21 and J θ2 22 .
The KUJ effect may affect the sign of J θ2 11 and J θ2 12. To see how the KUJ effect works when θ2≠0,
where However, the value of -θ 2 >0 cannot be too large because a large -θ 2 >0 gives a large In the Appendix, we have shown that the relative slope condition is met under
where φ2 and b2 are coefficients that are functions of consumption and the shadow price of capital evaluated at a steady state. Then, we obtain the range of the KUJ effect wherein the steady state is a sink.
It is worth noting that when α 2 =0, with θ 2 ≠0 our model is reduced to a one-sector growth model with a leisure externality. Benhabib and Farmer (2000) and Weder (2004) have studied the role of positive leisure externalities in establishing indeterminacy. 23 These authors showed that positive leisure externalities help establish indeterminacy as leisure externalities make it easier for the Frisch labor supply curve to slope down as a function of the real wage. However, they both found that it is difficult for the leisure externality alone to generate indeterminacy.
To quantify the conditions of indeterminacy in our model with the externality arising only from consumption goods, we offer the results in the left diagram of Figure 3 . The shaded area in the diagram is the region of (ε, -θ 2 ) under which the steady state is a sink. At ε=1.25, indeterminacy can be established at the smallest absolute value of -θ2=0.6%. 24 The required smallest degree of the KUJ in consumption goods is (-θ 2 )(ε-1)=0.0015. This required degree is only 10% as large as the required smallest KUJ effect of general goods consumption externalities at 0.0105 in Figure 2 .
The results indicate that indeterminacy emerges even more easily under consumption goods externalities than under general goods consumption externalities.
[Insert Figure 3 here]
We also quantify the case under α2=0. The right diagram of Figure 3 offers the region of (ε, Benhabib and Farmer (2000) and Weder (2004) in that it is difficult for the leisure externality alone to generate indeterminacy in one-sector growth models.
Goods 1 and 2 exhibit symmetric consumption externalities. (θ 1 ≠0, θ 2 ≠0).
We have derived the conditions under which general goods consumption externalities and consumption goods externalities each can be a source of indeterminacy. If we combine these conditions, externalities in both types of consumption together can establish indeterminacy.
23
The analysis provided by Benhabib and Farmer (2000) is a one-sector model with real balances but without capital in the production function. Weder (2004) is a one-sector growth model with externalities in production. In these two models, leisure is elastic. They both allow for leisure externalities in utility.
24 In the simulation a sink emerges, at ε=1.25, -θ 2 is in [0.006, 0.1] and γ is in [0.1655, 0.1659] . 25 In the simulation that gives a sink, at ε=0.5, θ 2 is larger than or equal to 8.0002. When θ 1 =8.0002, γ= 0.0197. When θ 1 is larger, γ is larger.
Similar to the case with only general goods consumption externalities (cf. (20) In the Appendix, we have shown that the relative slope condition is met if
where φ3, b3 and d3 are coefficients that are functions of consumption and the shadow price of capital evaluated at a steady state. Then, we obtain the range of the KUJ effect wherein the steady state is a sink.
Our analysis indicates that in a two-sector growth model, symmetric consumption externalities lead to indeterminacy even when the utility is homothetic. The result is different from that in the one-sector growth model provided by Alonso-Carrera et al. (2008) much larger than that in Figure 2 . For example, at ε=1.25, indeterminacy can be established at the smallest absolute value of -θ=50.76% here in Figure 4 , as opposed to -θ 1 =4.2% in Figure 2 . Thus, a positive leisure externality does not help the general goods consumption externality to establish indeterminacy in a one-sector model. This result is different from the findings uncovered by Benhabib and Farmer (2000) and Weder (2004) wherein the leisure externality helps establish indeterminacy in a model with both money and externalities in production.
Goods 2 is more capital intensive than goods 1
We have so far assumed the plausible case that the general goods sector is more capital intensive than the pure consumption goods sector, α1>α2. Nevertheless, from a theoretical point of view, it might be interesting to consider the opposite case that α 1 <α 2 . As shown in Section 3, with the jealousy effect of general goods consumption, the case of α1<α2 produces under-accumulation, rather than, over-accumulation of capital in the long run. It is interesting to quantitatively investigate local dynamic properties of equilibrium under a different intensity of capital.
To this end, we set α 1 =0.28 and α 2 =0.32 so the general goods sector is less capital intensive.
We recalibrate the model following the same method used in subsection 4.2.1. The baseline parameter values are not different but the values of the steady state change. 28 We quantify the KUJ effect with an adjustment of ES between the two goods to see whether the steady state is a sink.
The results are as follows.
First, if the ES between the two goods is smaller than unity (ε<1), the steady state is always a saddle. Second, if the ES between the two goods is larger than one (ε>1), whether the steady state is a sink or not depends on the source of consumption externalities and is as follows.
Case 1. θ 1 ≠0 and θ 2 =0
In this case, only general goods consumption has externalities. We find that the steady state is either a saddle or a source, not a sink. The result is thus different from those in the case of α 1 >α 2 as illustrated in the left diagram in Figure 2 . externalities is constant, the threshold here is increasing in the value of the ES between the two goods ε. Moreover, for a given value of ε, the required smallest KUJ effect here is much larger. For example, at ε=1.25, the required smallest KUJ effect here is 5.68, as opposed to 0.0015 in Figure 3 .
[Insert Figure 6 here].
Case 3. θ1=θ2=θ≠0.
In this case, two types of consumption have symmetric externalities. We find that the steady state is a sink only if 1<ε<1.1 (the right diagram of Figure 5 ). In this range of the ES, a sink arises if the value of -θ is larger than a large threshold. Note that different from the corresponding left diagram of Figure 4 wherein the required smallest degree of consumption externalities is constant, the threshold here is increasing in the value of the ES between the two goods. Moreover, for a given value of ε, the required degree of consumption externalities is large. For example, at ε=1.1, a sink emerges at the smallest value of -θ=148.6 and thus the required smallest KUJ effect is -θ(ε-1)=14.86, which is very large as compared to 0.0005 in the left diagram of Figure 4 . Even at ε=1.01, a sink requires a large smallest KUJ at 0.39069.
Economic Intuition for Indeterminacy Conditions
So far, we have presented a detailed analysis concerning the mathematical conditions for indeterminacy. To sum up, we have found: (i) regardless of the capital intensity ranking between the two sectors, indeterminacy tends to emerge under KUJ with negative levels θ 1 and θ 2 ; (ii) if the general goods sector is more capital intensive than the consumption goods sector, then local indeterminacy holds rather easily, and; (iii) if the general goods sector is less capital intensive than the consumption goods sector, then indeterminacy holds only when the consumption goods are associated with extremely high degrees of external effects.
To find insights within those results, it is useful to focus on the relation between the relative price of the general goods p and the shadow price of capital λ. Recall that the capital-labor ratio in Conversely, when the general good sector is less capital-intensive than the consumption good sector, the shadow price of capital exhibits self-destabilizing behavior,     / 0. λ λ It is thus necessary to hold     / 0. k k for indeterminacy. In addition, the self-stabilizing effect of capital should dominate the self-destabilizing effect of the shadow price of capital. With α2>α1, since the relative price of capital goods increases, a rise in capital stock reduces the production of general goods and increases its consumption, which promotes self-stabilizing behavior of capital. However, a higher k increases p, which raises the production of general goods. Therefore, if the external effects are small, the stabilizing effect of capital is not large enough to dominate the destabilizing effect of the shadow price of capital.
To sum up, indeterminacy in the presence of consumption externalities stems from the interaction between the price system and the quantity system. If there is no consumption externality, the price system is independent of the quantity system. Such an independency no longer holds in models with consumption externalities even if external effects are symmetric so that the preference is homothetic. Numerical examples shown above illustrate magnitudes of preference parameters under which the interaction between price and capital generates indeterminacy of converging paths.
Concluding Remarks
In one-sector neoclassical growth models, consumption externalities can produce an inefficient allocation in a steady state and create indeterminate equilibrium paths toward a steady state only if there is a labor-leisure tradeoff. In our paper, we have shown that in a two-sector neoclassical growth model with general goods and consumption goods, even if there is no labor-leisure tradeoff, consumption spillovers can yield inefficient allocation in a steady state and generate indeterminate equilibrium paths toward a steady state.
In our two-sector model, the factor reallocation and the consumption allocation between sectors are the mechanisms that generate these results. Consumption externalities change the MRS between sectors and affect the MRT which gives rise to an inefficient allocation in a steady state.
Moreover, equilibrium paths toward a steady state are indeterminate because these externalities generate the KUJ effect that influences the MRS and the MRT in such a way that self-fulfilling expectations about relative prices of the two goods can be supported as an equilibrium.
We find that even with negative general goods consumption externalities, capital is over (under) accumulated only if the general goods sector is more (less) capital-intensive than the consumption sector. Although consumption externalities distort the allocation of capital, no active capital taxes are necessary once the sources of consumption distortions are identified and corrected by consumption taxes. Next, when the general goods sector is more capital intensive, general goods consumption externalities generate indeterminacy more easily in a two-sector model than in a one-sector model. The consumption goods are leisure if the consumption goods sector does not use capital, but consumption externalities easily cause indeterminacy, while it is difficult for leisure externalities to generate indeterminacy. Finally, when there are symmetric consumption externalities so the utility is homothetic, the allocation is efficient in a steady state but the equilibrium path may be indeterminate. As a result, it does not matter whether consumption externalities are from general goods, consumption goods or both, it is much easier for consumption externalities to exhibit indeterminacy in a two-sector growth model than in a one-sector growth model. A two-sector model economy with consumption externalities is thus less stabilized than a one-sector model economy. α1=0.32, α2=0.28, δ=0.05, ρ=0.04, γ=0.1654, θ1=θ2=0 .) 
